Response to Chris -- Kant’s moral dilemma.

Kant’s argument is not predicated on sentience.   Kant considers rationality the key factor in determining what moral obligations we have to others.   Animals, according to Kant, are means, not ends.   They are ‘man’s instruments’ not ends in themselves, only rational beings are ends in themselves.  As such he condones e.g., vivisection because he says it furthers the aims of persons.   Yet he condemns e.g., sport hunting, or kicking dogs, because this reflects badly on our character, and more importantly may inform our behaviors towards other humans.   We might say that for Kant our direct obligations (action) towards animals in some cases, (e.g., not to kick the dog), is an indirect obligation to humans and not the other way around.   For Kant, the animal, or dog, cannot form judgments and therefore cannot be harmed, or ‘wronged’.     Kant is not concerned with the interests of the dog but with the interests of humanity – humanity is wronged when we kick the dog, not the dog itself.   Kant does think we should be kind to animals in our service even after they are done laboring for humans.   But he does not widen this consideration to animals that are killed for food for example.   Kant’s encouragement to treat animals well, in some instances, is motivated by his direct concern for rational beings; that means some, not all, humans for Kant; consider his views of certain indigenous peoples who lived lives of passion and excitement, not of reason and enlightenment according to Kant; such as the Tahitians.    Kant’s argument begs the question as to what extent our character is harmed when we directly and indirectly support such things as vivisection, animal testing, and slaughtering animals for food.