What is the value of the concept, value?

What privileges or rights do we derive from discoveries of intrinsic value in nature or by ascribing such values anthropocentrically by extension?    E.g., humans (some) possess a faculty for reason and because of this we designate ourselves as the higher species.   (But what rights or benefits are attached to this claim?)  (What interests?) Is our comfort (placement) the result of arbitrary selection?   No human makes a conscious choice to be human (at least in a biological sense).   Does this fact alone warrant empathy for all life, and respect for all things?   What do we gain by working from models of moral extension or when we say that humans alone have intrinsic value?    Do humans own the earth?   Is it right to say that the earth is now the property of humans?   Is this distinction of earth as property helpful here?  (Assuming that we do not adopt religious ideas of property, e.g., Locke’s position that the earth belongs to God, but He gave it to us for our use.)

Hill’s argument of human excellence – (2)

Hill states that “if a person views all "nonsentient nature" merely as a resource then it seems unlikely that he has developed the capacity needed to overcome self-importance”.   Value is an inherent property of things apart from any designated utility.    But might we override values or interests of other things when they do not enrich our lives in any other way but utility?    Hill says, “People who have no tendency to cherish things that give them pleasure may be poorly disposed to respond gratefully to persons who are good to them”.  Is “joy” or a “common tendency to cherish what enriches our lives” indicative of a narcissistic view of nature?  Hill’s argument is a compelling one, but I wonder why he qualifies his premises with the terms “that give them pleasure”, and “cherish what enriches our lives”.  

Kant speaks of aesthetic indifference, a point we reach as rational beings to see aesthetic experience as a pure understanding of the other.   Is there a similar reaction we might have in regard to the environment that preserves our interests and the interests or value of others separate from our usage or utility?       

Hill’s argument of human excellence – (1)

Hill postulates humility, proper humility, as the attribute that shifts our consciousness from concerns of moral extension to gratitude as a virtue of human excellence.   This is an intriguing argument.  While he does state that indifference to others (“nonsentient nature”) is not itself a moral vice, Hill suggests we need to overcome such behavior to have proper humility – but he does not seem to condemn this type of human character; rather he sees indifference as a flaw of sorts – we are somehow not fully human without virtue, without gratitude.   Is this argument anthropocentric due to our concern (active occupation) with living a life of excellence, or is it duty based, or something else?   Does our intent matter here, i.e., what are some reasons why we might want to live a virtuous life?  Is it in our interest to develop into a full and enriched human being?  Is it a utilitarian idea that we “cherish what enriches our lives”?   Are anthropocentric views of the environment as having spiritual instrumental value similar to this idea of taking pleasure in what enriches our lives? 

The realization and extension of the (s)Self.

Is difference between things (environments) and persons possible in Deep ecology?  When we sacrifice or give up the egoistic (small s) in favor of an interconnected, and therefore dependent, Self – are we “incorporating” everything (“otherness”) into our ego or do we transcend the “self” and realize a comprehensive consciousness that does not require principles or duty to define our relationship with nature?  The act of self-realization as a necessary condition is interconnected with nature, and therefore environments must flourish for humans to reach a state of ecological consciousness.  In this way are we identifying with, recognizing, (seeing), the natural world or radically extending our ego to gain control over nature?   

The origins of reckless Anthropocentricism.

The Europeans who came to America in search of commodities and riches possessed a capitalistic mindset; individual wealth and accomplishment trumped the communal good and respect for indigenous peoples.  They also brought Christian attitudes about property; i.e., God gave the earth to humans in kind to rule over or exercise dominion over , (but the earth still belonged to God).   They saw the wilderness as unused land, or what Locke and others refer to as “wasteland”.   The idea that nature was something to be conquered conflicted with Native American ideas of stewardship.   Europeans may have felt they had a God given right to take such property, either by deceptive means or force (colonization).  This attitude is reflected today in some extreme anthropocentric views that nature has instrumental value only; animals and ecosystems are resources for our exclusive usage absent any consideration for individual members. 

Do we still carry the residue weight of our ancestor’s opinions that humans have an inherent right, perhaps even a duty, to subdue nature for our purposes, to view everything in nature as a human resource, a means to an end?   Are we burdened with a religious vanity of sorts?

Status quo ante

Are Westernized ideas of prosperity, and property, responsible for our current state of affairs regarding happiness and the environment?   The omission of Native Americans in the introduction is striking.   Several hundred years prior to the arrival of the European “conquerors” Native Americans practiced (practice) a form of conservationism that fostered generosity towards the communal good.  This generosity and giving confers the status or wealth of a person, not private ownership of things or property.   The environment, inanimate and animate, possesses spiritual power; is revered, not exploited for profit.   Perhaps a fundamental reevaluation of happiness and property might better empower us to make practical changes; to fuel our theoretical engines.