Aldo Leopold, Preferences, and the Land Ethic.

Does Leopold’s land ethic require a necessary set of conditions i.e., human moral excellence, empathy and compassion?    Is this anti-economic in principle?    Leopold uses the terms: conscience, individual responsibility, respect, and integrity.   This might require a rigorous moral training in search of truth and virtue not unlike that of Socrates and his ‘mad’ reflection Diogenes.   Are humans up to the task?  Or, are we so disconnected from the land that self-development (whatever that may mean) and soul purification (again, whatever that may mean) usurp empathy and compassion from the reservoir of moral excellence?   Rather than extension of empathy and compassion, does our narcissism reflect these attributes inward in the interests of self-interest?

The idea of human from conqueror to member or citizen is a powerful one.   Yet, Leopold’s position seems contradictory.   He says that a serious obstacle impeding the evolution of a land ethic is our moving away from a universal consciousness (231).   Yet, the land ethic in principle may work as private property or possibly as property in commons.    Key to this discussion is Leopold’s view that animals are property.    He says, on pg.231, “Synthetic substances for wood, leather, wool, and other natural land products suit him better than the originals.”  Animals and the land are “products”, this designation does not consider inherent value.   In one paragraph he speaks of the integrity of the biotic community and in another he views animals and land as resources.  

Leopold demands an extension of moral excellence, empathy, respect, and compassion beyond our persons; does this mean that we must reevaluate our current conceptions of property?

A request.

Due to an injury, I cannot be in class this week.   Might someone take a few brief notes, and send them along, on any insights that may arise from class discussion that are not explicitly contained in text/readings?   Thanks.

Soren Kierkegaard on Duty, and the value of ethical choice and aesthetic “choice”

I came across this passage today from Kierkegaard’s Enten/Eller II, 1902, it reflects and calls into question the fundamental premise of Russow’s argument; aesthetic value as an ethical choice.  

You have chosen the aesthetic, but an aesthetic choice is not choice. The act of choosing is essentially a proper and stringent expression of the ethical. Whenever one really makes a conscious choice, it involves the ethical. That is, the only absolute either/or is the choice between good and evil, and this is precisely the ethical. The aesthetic choice is either entirely immediate, a giving in to one’s emotions, and to that extent no choice at all, or else it is the kind of choice that is temporary and diverse. When a person deliberates aesthetically upon a number of life’s perplexities, he does not easily get a single either/or, but a whole multiplicity, because the defining factor in the choice is not ethically emphasized, and because when one does not choose absolutely one chooses only for the moment, and so can choose something different the next moment. The ethical choice is therefore, in one sense, much easier, simpler, but in another sense, infinitely more difficult.

Russow’s Noah’s Ark Fallacy

Having living individual members is not a condition for a species to exist as a category, e.g., extinct species.  Having living individual members is a necessary condition when talking of preservation of a species, as this implies the existence of actual living members.   Russow’s argument that “we value and protect animals because of their aesthetic value” is predicated on human interests overriding any and all other concerns.   Her call for the preservation of certain animals (She suggests but does not develop a theory of value based on stronger or weaker duties or obligations) is sympathetic at first glance, but a thorough review of her intent reveals a motive very similar to the one proposed by Richard Epstein, (Professor of Law, legal theorist,  and author).    Epstein posits that humans have absolute rights over animals and the environment, this is fundamental and non-negotiable.  Animals are property and anyone who disagrees with this idea should be considered a threat to human existence.   Animal rights activists and abolitionists that seek rights for animals on par with humans e.g., a basic right to life, are a danger to society, “a mortal threat to human society that few humans would, or should accept”.

Russow questions the value of interest rights theory in general siding with the “generally accepted” and the “majority”.   Arguments based on sentience alone are a good place to start for anyone seeking alternatives to interest based theories, or any other moral obligations defined by “special” attributes.   Note how Russow might preserve certain individual members of species without committing to the preservation of the whole.   She states (197) that rarity and unexpectedness is more delightful than everyday encounters.   Based on this premise, do we have a moral obligation to reduce the number of certain species so that we may have more delightful and enriching life experiences?  

Russow does not think it wrong to deprive individual members of their natural habitat (191).   

We might envision an Orwellian scenario of sorts where we have a select few individual members of a species in an artificial environment for our aesthetic pleasure, while we breed billions of other more ordinary “everyday” animals for our culinary delights, fashion trends, and entertainment.   This is why Epstein and others say it’s a matter of human survival that animals remain property; for human tastes and interests.      

Response to Sebastian

If we accept that we are all living within environments of some sort, causing harm to anything seems counter intuitive to our genuine happiness as a species.   Just one example (there are many) where humans cause harm to the environments we live in is the case of toxic chemicals.   From the ACOG website, “Approximately 700 new chemicals are introduced into the US market each year, and more than 84,000 chemical substances are being used in manufacturing and processing or are being imported. “The scary fact is that we don’t have safety data on most of these chemicals even though they are everywhere—in the air, water, soil, our food supply, and everyday products,” Dr. Conry said. “Bisphenol A (BPA), a hormone disruptor, is a common toxic chemical contained in our food, packaging, and many consumer products.”   Note the passive language; humans, directly and indirectly, support the products of companies that ditch waste into rivers and communities.  

There is also what Derek Parfit calls the “non-identity problem”, the idea that we don’t know the identity of future persons, and we don’t know what moral standing these probable persons have, and what obligations we might have to them concerning environmental policies.    This represents a difficult argument as we decide how to extend moral standing to future persons. 

The idea that we harm our character when we cause harm to anything makes sense.    I think this is a case of practice lagging behind moral intuition and theory.   Are the benefits that we derive from harmful animal and environmental policies worth the risks?