Soren Kierkegaard on Duty, and the value of ethical choice and aesthetic “choice”

I came across this passage today from Kierkegaard’s Enten/Eller II, 1902, it reflects and calls into question the fundamental premise of Russow’s argument; aesthetic value as an ethical choice.  

You have chosen the aesthetic, but an aesthetic choice is not choice. The act of choosing is essentially a proper and stringent expression of the ethical. Whenever one really makes a conscious choice, it involves the ethical. That is, the only absolute either/or is the choice between good and evil, and this is precisely the ethical. The aesthetic choice is either entirely immediate, a giving in to one’s emotions, and to that extent no choice at all, or else it is the kind of choice that is temporary and diverse. When a person deliberates aesthetically upon a number of life’s perplexities, he does not easily get a single either/or, but a whole multiplicity, because the defining factor in the choice is not ethically emphasized, and because when one does not choose absolutely one chooses only for the moment, and so can choose something different the next moment. The ethical choice is therefore, in one sense, much easier, simpler, but in another sense, infinitely more difficult.