Friday, January 24, 2014

Hill’s argument of human excellence – (2)



Hill states that “if a person views all "nonsentient nature" merely as a resource then it seems unlikely that he has developed the capacity needed to overcome self-importance”.   Value is an inherent property of things apart from any designated utility.    But might we override values or interests of other things when they do not enrich our lives in any other way but utility?    Hill says, “People who have no tendency to cherish things that give them pleasure may be poorly disposed to respond gratefully to persons who are good to them”.  Is “joy” or a “common tendency to cherish what enriches our lives” indicative of a narcissistic view of nature?  Hill’s argument is a compelling one, but I wonder why he qualifies his premises with the terms “that give them pleasure”, and “cherish what enriches our lives”.  

Kant speaks of aesthetic indifference, a point we reach as rational beings to see aesthetic experience as a pure understanding of the other.   Is there a similar reaction we might have in regard to the environment that preserves our interests and the interests or value of others separate from our usage or utility?       

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